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No. 19383

v.
MICHAEL RAY LARSEN,
Defendant-Appellant.
APPELLANT'S BRIEF

NATURE OF THE CASE
Plaintiff's action is for the aggregate of items (unpaid
rentals, sales tax, late charges, residual value and sales tax
thereon, costs and personal property tax, costs of court and attorney
fees) due under an equipment lease, less sale proceeds after repossession.

Defendant by his answer contended the lease was intended as

security and subject to the provisions of the UCC's Article 9, and
that plaintiff's failure to comply with the Article 9 requirements
as to disposition of repossessed collateral precludes plaintiff from
recovery in this action.

Plaintiff moved for summary judgment.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The lower court granted plaintiff's motion fr.r summary judgment.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Reversal of the lower court's summary Judgment.
MATERIAL FACTS
On September 23, 1977, defendant obtained a crawler-loader
(equipment)

from plaintiff on a 60-month lease.

The equipment

was purchased by plaintiff from a supplier specifically for
defendant

(R-5-8).

Defendant defaulted and the equipment was

repossessed and eventually sold

(the complaint states the net

proceeds of sale to be $3300.00

[R 3]; Tal Kennedy's affidavit

[R 23]

states the sale proceeds to be $6000.00).

The lease (R-5-8), after identifying the equipment, states
the amount of each monthly payment, including sales tax, to be
$817.82 for "rental", and $40.89 per month for "use tax", that
payments are to be made "monthly", that the initial term of the
lease is "5 years", that the number of payments is "60", that
the security deposit is "none", and that the renewal rental
"after the initial term" is "none, payable annually in advance."
The lease is silent as to an option.

However, at the time

of the transaction there was a verbal agreement between plaintiff
and defendant that defendant had an option to purchase the
equipment at the end of the lease for its "residual value" of
$3386.45 and sales tax, and custom and usage dictated such an
arrangement

(R 53-54A, 561.

of the equipment was $16,500

In September 1982 the market value
(R-54).

The lease-end responsibility of defendant is to "return
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the equipment in good repair, ordinary wear and tear resulting
from proper use thereof alone expected [sic], by delivering it,
packed and ready for shipment, to such place or carrier as
lessor [plaintiff] may specify."

Under the renewal provisions

of paragraph 9 of the lease, after the initial term of five
years, the lease is automatically

renewed each year for a term

of one year, for no rent, and otherwise upon the terms and
conditions of the lease, unless defendant gives plaintiff written
notice of cancellation at least thirty days before the expiration
of the preceding term.
Under the lease, defendant is required to make all necessary
repairs to the equipment, and to bear the entire risk of loss,
theft, damage or destruction of the equipment from any cause
whatsoever; and defendant is to pay all taxes, maintenance,
insurance and other costs relating to the equipment, and provides an agreement for defendant to indemnify plaintiff and hold
plaintiff harmless from any claims arising from the use of the
equipment, and to give defendant the benefit of the supplier's
warranties.

It further provides that plaintiff made no represent-

ations or warranties with respect to the equipment, and was not
liable to the defendant for any damage due to delays in delivery
or installation of the equipment, and plaintiff did not select
or inspect the equipment.
There is nothing in the record to indicate the relation
between rental charges and depreciation, obsolescence or that
the rentals were normal or that the defendant was not acquiring
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an equity in the equipment.
A disputed issue of fact exists concerning thP corrPct
balance which is due under the lease

(R-23, 57).

Defendant's discovery of relevant information

(R-63-66) was

cut short by the lower court's entry of summary judgment.
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITY
The true lease versus security interest was improperly
resolved by the lower court.
On a motion for summary judgment the issues are defined by
the pleadings.

Security Pacific Nat. Bank V. Adamo, 191 Cal

Rptr 134 (CalApp,1983).

Plaintiff's complaint averred a true

lease whereas defendant's answer contended the lease was a
purchase agreement.

The contention precipitates a genuine issue

of fact which would preclude the granting of a summary judgment.
Boise Cascade Corporation v. Stonewood Development Corp., 655
P 2d 668

(Utah, 1982).

The trial court was required to resolve

the disputed fact of true lease versus security interest and
by its grant of summary judgment impliedly found that the agreement and transaction forming the basis of this lawsuit was a
lease that did not create a security interest subject to the
provisions of UCC's Article 9.

The resolution of the issue

suggests that a genuine issue exists.
The broad scope of UCC's Article 9 is stated in Section
70A-9-102, U.C.A., 1953,
this chapter applies to

"Except as otherwise provided * * *
(a) any transaction (regardless of its

form)which is intended to create a security interest in
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personal property."

Therefore, if a transaction in the form of

a lease is actually intended to be a sale, reserving to the
"lessor" a security interest, it falls under the ambit of Article
9.

FMA Financial Corp. v. Pro-Printers, 590 P 2d 803

(Utah,1979).

Section 70A-l-201(37), U.C.A., 1953, as amended, provides in
relevant part, "Whether a lease is intended as security is to be
determined by the facts of each case; however

(a) the inclusion

of an option to purchase does not of itself make the lease one
intended as security, and

(b) an agreement that upon compliance

with the terms of the lease, the lessee shall become or has the
option to become the owner of the property for no additional
consideration or for a nominal consideration does make the lease
one intended for security."
The lower court apparently was of the opinion the assertion
by defendant of an oral option, and the existence of an option
based on custom and usage, posed inadmissible evidence because
of the parol evidence rule and therefore could not be considered
in connection with the factual determination as to whether the
transaction between plaintiff and defendant is a true lease or
one intended as security.
An assertion that a custom and usage exists does not involve
an opinion and is theefore admissible.

7 J. Wigmore, Evidence,

Section or Paragraph 1954 (Chadburn rev. ed. 1972); DiMarzo v.
American Mut.

Ins. Co., 449 NE 2d 1189 (Mass. ,1983).

The lease is completely silent with respect to the option
and therefore the parol evidence rules does not preclude evidence
of an oral option because there would be no contradiction of the
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lease terms.

Vol 1972, No.

3, Law Forum,

"Equipment Leasing."

A question remains as to the nominality of the option pr ice;
but the fact that an option price is not nominal, or that no
option exists, does not foreclose construing a purported lease as
a purchase agreement.
Mach., 667 P 2d 1232

Western Enterprises v. Arctic Off ice
(Alaska,1983).

On plaintiff's motion for summary Judgment it had the
burden of showing that there are no genuine issues of material
fact and that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Carnes v. Carnes, 668 P 2d 555 (Utah,1983).

The lease provis-

ions themselves, as well as the existence of an option and its
nominality, are apposite in making the determination of true
lease versus purchase agreement.

76 ALR 3rd l; Ford Motor

Credit Company v. Dowdy, 284 SE 2d 679

(Ga.App.,1981).

CONCLUSION
Questions of fact remain for trial as to whether the
intention of the parties was the creation of a true lease or
security for sale of the equipment; and,

if a security instru-

ment, whether the disposition by plaintiff was commercially
reasonable.
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ROYAL K. HUNT
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
On November 21, 1983, two copies of this Appellant's Brief
were mailed first-class, postage pre-paid,
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to L. Edward Robbins, attorney for plaintiff-respondent, at his
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